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STATEMENT OF INTEREST 
 
  My interest in the issues presented in this case stems from my career in labor law, as well 
as my research that specifically addresses the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB or Board) 
regulation of electronic communications.  Following four years as an attorney in the NLRB’s 
Appellate Court Branch, I have taught and researched labor and employment law for over fourteen 
years.   
  My research includes several pieces related to the questions at issue in this case.  I have 
explored the important role that communications play in ensuring employees’ ability to exercise 
their statutory right to engage in collective action, as well as the potential conflicts between 
employees’ communications and employers’ property interests.  See Communication Breakdown: 
Reviving the Role of Discourse in the Regulation of Employee Collective Action, 44 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1091 (2011); Taking State Property Rights Out of Federal Labor Law, 47 B.C. L. REV. 
891 (2006).  More specifically, I have written extensively on the NLRB’s regulation of electronic 
communications.  See Worker Collective Action in the Digital Age, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 921 (2015); 
E-Mail and the Rip Van Winkle of Agencies: The NLRB’s Register Guard Decision, in WORKPLACE 
PRIVACY: HERE AND ABROAD—PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 61ST ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE ON LABOR (Jonathan Nash ed., 2010); The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the 
NLRA?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 262 (2008).  I also submitted an amicus brief in Purple 








SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Like other government agencies, the National Labor Relations Board is frequently called 
upon to interpret its governing statute.  Especially with a statute as vague as the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA or Act), there is a great deal of leeway to make such interpretations and their 
accompanying policy judgments.  As a result, in the vast majority of NLRB cases, there can be 
reasonable disagreements about the outcome.  This is not one of those cases. 
 Unlike the usual NLRB policy reversals that occur following a change in the presidential 
administration, the issue in this case is cabined by clear precedent from the Supreme Court and 
basic property law.  Consequently, although Board Members may have sincere disagreements 
about what the best outcome should be, the governing law points in only one direction. 
 In Purple Communications, Inc., 361 NL.R.B. 1050 (2014), the NLRB set forth a new 
analysis covering employees’ use of employer-provided email.  Under this analysis, which is based 
on the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 
(1945), the Board presumes that employees who have access to their employer’s email as part of 
their work duties can use that email for Section 7 purposes during nonwork time.  Purple 
Communications, 361 N.L.R.B. at 1063.  The employer can rebut this presumption by showing 
that special business circumstances justify additional restrictions on employees’ email use.  Id.  In 
contrast to the Board’s prior rule, the Purple Communications presumption is fully consistent with 
the NLRA and Supreme Court precedent. 
 The Purple Communications analysis replaced the Board’s previous approach to email 
communications, as set forth in Guard Publishing Co. (Register Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 
(2007), enforced in part, enforcement denied in part, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  This reversal 
was appropriate and necessary because Register Guard was indefensible under current law.  By 




7 purposes, Register Guard directly conflicted with Republic Aviation and the Court’s subsequent 
decision in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).  In its attempt to avoid these holdings, 
the Register Guard majority attempted to differentiate real and personal property, but did so in a 
manner that defied well-established tenets of property law. 
 No matter what various parties want the outcome in this case to be, the simple fact remains 
that the Purple Communications analysis is consistent with governing law, while the Register 
Guard is not.  In Republic Aviation, the Court long ago recognized that employers’ real property 
interests are not absolute and cannot eliminate employees’ Section 7 right to communicate about 
matters of mutual aid and protection at the workplace—which stands in contrast to the opposite 
approach that Lechmere requires for nonemployee communications.  Republic Aviation permits 
employers to implement email usage rules that serve legitimate business purposes, but employers 
cannot preclude all Section 7 emails.  This is true even if employees have other means to 
communicate.  Republic Aviation and other precedent establish that employees have a right to 
engage in any form of Section 7 communications during nonwork time or in nonwork areas, as 
long as no legitimate business rule is violated.  Email is no different.  It is merely a modern form 
of the proverbial water cooler, and the NLRB should treat it as such.   
 In short, the NLRB should reaffirm its Purple Communications approach.  It should also 
extend that analysis to other forms of electronic communications.  Texts and other non-email forms 
of electronic communications have become popular in the workplace and should be treated on the 
same footing.  And that footing should be equivalent to other Section 7 communications that fall 
under the Republic Aviation framework.  Indeed, if there are any differences in the Board’s 
governance of the various types of communications, it should provide employees greater rights to 
use electronic communications, which are entitled to less protection under property law and are 





I. THE PURPLE COMMUNICATIONS FRAMEWORK IS CONSISTENT WITH 
 SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT—REGISTER GUARD IS NOT 
 
  Although email is a more recent method of communication, it is still just that: a method of 
communication.  As a result, this case, as well as Purple Communications and Register Guard, are 
covered by well-established Supreme Court precedent.  That precedent makes clear that the central 
question is not the type of communication, but whether the communication is made by an employee 
or a nonemployee.  Because this case involves an employee communication, a Republic Aviation 
analysis of the sort used in Purple Communications is required. See generally Hirsch, Worker 
Collective Action in the Digital Age, supra, at 926-934 (discussing importance of electronic 
communications to employees’ exercise of their Section 7 rights); Hirsch, Communication 
Breakdown, supra, at 1101-11, 1119-24 (same). 
 A. The Supreme Court’s Republic Aviation Holding Requires Employers to Permit   
   Employees to Engage in Protected Communications in the Workplace  
 
 The Supreme Court’s seminal Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) 
decision directly controls this case.  Both this case and Republic Aviation involve employee 
attempts to engage in communications that are protected under Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 157.  Both this case and Republic Aviation involve employer arguments that their property 
interests should trump employees’ NLRA right to communicate.  Both this case and Republic 
Aviation should have the same result: employer property interests cannot blindly prevent 
employees’ Section 7 communications. 
 In Republic Aviation, the Court unambiguously held that employers’ right to control use of 
their real property is not absolute.  Id. at 797-98, 802 n.8.  Rather, employers’ property interests 




also Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 491 (1978); NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 
325 (1974) (“The place of work is a place uniquely appropriate for dissemination of views 
concerning the bargaining representative and the various options open to the employees. . . . 
[B]anning [employee solicitations at work] . . . might seriously dilute [Section] 7 rights.”).  
According to the Court, this balance involves a shifting presumption test that protects employees’ 
right to communicate with each other during appropriate times and in appropriate places, while 
allowing employers to set limits when necessary to fulfill legitimate business needs.  Id. at 803 
n.10. 
 Contrary to the Register Guard majority’s statement that “employees had no statutory right 
to use the [employer’s] e-mail system for Section 7 matters,”  351 N.L.R.B. at 1114, the Court in 
Republic Aviation was explicit in recognizing employees’ right to discuss unionization and other 
Section 7 matters while using their employer’s property.  324 U.S. at 801, 803.  The Court 
acknowledged that employers have relevant property interests, but stressed that such interests must 
often give way to employees’ Section 7 rights.  Id. at 797-98, 802 n.8 
 Matters are very different, however, when nonemployee communications are at play.  In 
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992), the Court held that in contrast to employees’ direct 
Section 7 right to communicate, nonemployees have only an indirect right. Id. at 531-32.  Thus, 
employers’ property interests hold much greater sway.  As a result, employers can prohibit 
nonemployees from accessing the worksite to communicate with employees unless there are 
“unique obstacles” to accessing employees or the exclusion is discriminatory.  Id. at 535, 538, 540-
41.  According to the Court, the key holding in Lechmere was the “distinction ‘of substance,’ 
between the union activities of employees and nonemployees.”  Id. at 537 (quoting NLRB v. 




Guard’s conclusion that employees have no Section 7 right at all to communicate by email if they 
have any other means of communications.1  That statement is true of nonemployees, but unless the 
Supreme Court reverses Lechmere and Republic Aviation, the same is not true of employees. 
 The combination of Lechmere and Republic Aviation establish a long-standing and clear 
demarcation:  the Republic Aviation analysis applies to employee communications and Lechmere 
applies to nonemployee communications.  In other words, employers’ property interests must 
typically yield to employees’ right to communicate, but when nonemployees try to communicate 
on employer property, then Section 7 generally must give way.  See Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 
U.S. at 113; Metro. Dist. Council v. NLRB, 68 F.3d 61, 75 (3d Cir. 1995); Leslie Homes, Inc., 316 
                                                 
1 Note that both the majority in Register Guard and the General Counsel in his brief in this case misleadingly quote 
Republic Aviation to support the claim that the Supreme Court limited employees’ right to use employer’s property 
only to the extent that employees’ ability to communicate would otherwise be “entirely deprived.”  Register Guard, 
351 N.L.R.B. at 1115 (quoting Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 801 n.6); Brief for the General Counsel at 6, 11-13, Rio 
All-Suites Hotel Casino, Case 28-CA-060841 (2018).  The Court in Republic Aviation said nothing of the kind.  
Instead, the “entirely deprived” language in Republic Aviation was a quotation from part of one of the cases under 
review in which the NLRB described the facts that led it to strike down the no-solicitation rule in that case: 
 
Thus, under the conditions obtaining in January 1943, the respondent’s employees, working long hours in a 
plant engaged entirely in war production and expanding with extreme rapidity, were entirely deprived of their 
normal right to “full freedom of association” in the plant on their own time, the very time and place uniquely 
appropriate and almost solely available to them therefor.  The respondent’s rule is therefore in clear 
derogation of the rights of its employees guaranteed by the Act. 
 
Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 801 n.6 (quoting Republic Aviation Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 1186, 1195 (1943).  That the 
Court’s holding in Republic Aviation was not limited to otherwise “entirely deprived” communications is made clear 
in the same paragraph, when the Court upheld the NLRB’s Peyton Packing presumption:  
 
. . . It is no less true that time outside working hours, whether before or after work, or during luncheon or rest 
periods, is an employee’s time to use as he wishes without unreasonable restraint, although the employee is 
on company property.  It is therefore not within the province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule 
prohibiting union solicitation by an employee outside of working hours, although on company property.  Such 
a rule must be presumed to be an unreasonable impediment to self-organization and therefore discriminatory 
in the absence of evidence that special circumstances make the rule necessary in order to maintain production 
or discipline. 
 
Id. at 803 n.10 (quoting Peyton Packing Co., Inc., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943)); see also id. at 802 n.8 (upholding 
and quoting same rule in Letourneau Co. of Georgia, 54 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1259, 1260 (1944): “[T]he Board has held 
that, while it was ‘within the province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation 
during working hours,’ it was ‘not within the province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting 
union solicitation by an employee outside of working hours, although on company property,’ the latter restriction 
being deemed an unreasonable impediment to the exercise of the right to self-organization.’”); Purple 




N.L.R.B. 123, 125, 129 (1995); see also UFCW v. NLRB (Oakland Mall II & Loehmann’s Plaza 
II), 74 F.3d 292, 298-99 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  The error of Register Guard—or any framework that 
retains its basic presumption in favor of employer property interests, including those mentioned in 
the invitation for briefs in this case—is that it directly conflicts with these well-established 
Supreme Court precedents.  And neither the distinction between real and personal property, nor a 
weak First Amendment argument, undermines that fact. 
 B. The Personal Property at Issue in Email Cases Strengthens Employees’ Republic  
   Aviation Right to Communicate  
 
In Republic Aviation, the Court was clear in holding that an employer does not have an 
unfettered right to restrict use of its real property by employees communicating about Section 7 
issues.  324 U.S. at 802 (holding that “[i]nconvenience or even some dislocation of property 
rights[] may be necessary in order to safeguard the right to collective bargaining”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Because of this precedent, Register Guard was by necessity centered 
on the claim that a different rule should apply to personal property, in particular that employers 
can restrict access to electronic and other personal property for any reason at all, except for 
discrimination along Section 7 lines.  See Register Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1114 (stating that “there 
is no statutory right . . . to use an employer’s equipment or media as long as the restrictions are 
nondiscriminatory”) (internal quotation marks omitted). But this claim violates a basic tenet of 
property law.  
Electronic communication systems, like other personal property, are considered “chattel.”  
Under property law, an owner’s interest in chattel is inferior to an interest in real property.  This 
difference is illustrated by the types of proof required in trespass actions.  Although a trespass 
claim involving real property assumes harm in all instances of trespass, a trespass of chattel claim 




2003) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218, which subjects a trespasser of chattel to 
liability “only if” the chattel is dispossessed, harmed, or deprived of use for a substantial period of 
time); PROSSER & KEETON, TORTS 87, 90 (5th ed. 1984)).  Moreover, an individual’s unauthorized 
use of another’s chattel—such as an employee’s improper use of an employer’s email system—
does not result in liability unless the use was “for a time so substantial that it is possible to estimate 
the loss caused thereby.  A mere momentary or theoretical deprivation of use is not sufficient . . . .”  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218, cmt. i.  Given the lower protection for personal property, 
the Court’s admonition in Republic Aviation that real property must give way to employees’ 
Section 7 interests should, at a minimum, apply to email and other personal property.  
Employee communication cases demonstrate why personal property is entitled to less 
protection than real property.  In cases like Republic Aviation and Lechmere, use of an employer’s 
real property is a physical invasion that necessarily interferes with others’ use of the property.  See 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426, 435 (1982) (holding that even 
minor physical invasions of property is an unconstitutional deprivation or taking of that property); 
Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in Cyberspace:  Union 
Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 47-48 (2000) (discussing distinction 
between in-person solicitations at work and electronic solicitations).  Electronic communications, 
however, are not physical invasions.  In addition, use of an email system will almost never interfere 
with others’ use of that system.  Compare Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 308 (holding that emails at issue did 
not cause “any physical or functional harm or disruption” to employer’s computer system), with 
CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (noting 




In Register Guard, the Board ignored this reality and claimed instead that employers 
needed the ability to restrict employees’ email usage to preserve “server space, protect[] against 
computer viruses and dissemination of confidential information, and avoid[] company liability for 
employees’ inappropriate e-mails.”  Register Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1114.  However, neither the 
Board nor the employer in that case provided any evidence that employees’ use of the employer’s 
email system for Section 7 communications impaired business operations.  This dearth of evidence 
is unsurprising given what anyone reading this brief knows: in many workplaces, email is 
ubiquitous.  To be sure, the cumulative effect of a large flow of emails can impact productivity, 
but despite this fact, we still do not see widespread implementation of rules imposing productivity-
based limits on email usage.  Cf. Jim Harter, Should Employers Ban Email After Work Hours?, 
GALLUP (2014) (noting that 79% employers view employee use of email, including after work 
hours, as strongly or somewhat positive);2 Amy Gallo, Stop Email Overload, HARVARD BUSINESS 
REVIEW (2011) (arguing that email overload can be a problem, but is really a symptom of 
ineffective workplace protocols).3  And even if email overload were perceived as a bigger problem 
than it is currently, Section 7 messages typically represent only a tiny portion of this overall email 
flow.  As a result, there is no evidence that Section 7 communications pose problems—particularly 
ones more serious than those in Republic Aviation—that warrant a rule giving employers an 
unfettered right to limit electronic communications.  Far more defensible is a rule that permits 
employers to restrict such communications only when it can show a valid business justification.  
One of the ironies of Register Guard was that email is a particularly weak example of 
personal property that deserves protection.  An individual’s use of other types of personal property, 
such as such as telephones, bulletin boards, and photocopiers, can interfere with others’ use of 
                                                 
2 Available at https://www.gallup.com/workplace/236519/employers-ban-email-work-hours.aspx. 




such property.  But normal email and other electronic communications usually does not interfere 
with others’ communications at all.  Sending or receiving email is commonplace—indeed, it 
appears to be the most common form of communication at work, see, e.g., Bob O’Donnell, 
Workplace of the Future: Progress, But Slowly, Technalysis Research (2016)4 (finding that email 
was top form of workplace communication, followed by telephone, texting, social media, and 
instant messaging)—and almost never involves additional costs or measurable negative effects on 
business operations.  See Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 308 (holding that unauthorized email was not a 
trespass because, among other reasons, “[t]hese occasional transmissions cannot reasonably be 
viewed as impairing the quality or value of [the employer’s] computer system.”).  Moreover, under 
Purple Communications, employers are permitted to safeguard against or remedy the rare cases 
when email does impose significant costs.  See Purple Communications, 361 N.L.R.B. at 1063 
(“An employer may rebut the presumption [that employees can use the employer’s email] by 
demonstrating that special circumstances necessary to maintain production or discipline justify 
restricting its employees’ rights.”); Hirsch, Workers Collective Action in the Digital Age, supra, at 
947, 950-951 (discussing Purple Communications’ protection of valid business concerns). 
In sum, two well-established legal facts require the Board to maintain a Purple 
Communications-type framework and reject that of Register Guard.  First, in Republic Aviation, 
the Supreme Court unequivocally held that employers’ real property must often yield to 
employees’ Section 7 right to communicate.  Second, under basic property law, personal 
property—like electronic communications systems—are entitled to less protection than real 
property.  As a result, employees’ use of email and other electronic communications for Section 7 
                                                 






purposes are entitled to at least, if not more, protection than traditional communications under the 
Republic Aviation framework. 
C.   Supreme Court Precedent and Basic Property Law Outweigh the NLRB’s  
 Overruled and Flawed Personal Property Precedent 
 
As noted by the Board in Register Guard, the legal precedents described in the previous 
section are countered by various NLRA cases that purport to recognize employers’ unfettered right 
to restrict use of their personal property.  351 N.L.R.B. at 1114 (noting that this “well-settled 
principle” was “[c]onsistent with a long line of cases governing employee use of employer-owned 
equipment”).  In Purple Communications, however, the Board properly recognized these cases for 
what they really were—a convoluted game of “telephone” that were rooted solely in one line of 
dicta from an administrative law judge (ALJ). See 361 N.L.R.B. at 1058-59 (dismissing most 
statements as dicta and rejecting all of their applications to email cases).  Such dicta is far too weak 
to overcome the requirements of Republic Aviation and the basic tenets of property law. 
To be sure, some decisions cited by the Board in Register Guard and others supporting its 
approach include language that seems to permit employers to restrict employees’ use of email as 
they see fit.  See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 657, 663-64 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating 
that an employer “unquestionably had the right to regulate and restrict” employees’ use of a 
bulletin board).  But such language is built upon unsupported statements in cases that originally 
addressed a different issue.   
Although the Sixth Circuit in Union Carbide stated that employers had an 
“unquestionable” right to restrict Section 7 uses of their personal property, such a claim was only 
unquestioned because neither the NLRB nor courts at that time had considered the issue in a 
meaningful way.  Indeed, every case the Board in Register Guard cited for this proposition failed 




of employers’ personal property.5  The sole justification for these cases’ suggestion that employers 
have an unencumbered right to control their personal property is ultimately based on one sentence 
by an ALJ in a case that involved a related, but different, issue. 
The first decision to claim that employers can freely prevent employees from using their 
employers’ personal property was, to the best of my knowledge, by an ALJ in Challenge Cook 
Brothers of Ohio, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 92 (1965).  In that case, the ALJ stated in dicta that it “had 
no doubt” that an employer that maintained a practice of preventing employees from using work 
bulletin boards for personal matters could also prohibit union postings.  Id. at 99.  However, as the 
ALJ acknowledged, Challenge Cook was not such a case because it involved instead an employer 
that allowed many kinds of personal postings, but not ones related to the union.6  All of the 
subsequent cases purporting to recognize a right of employers to exclude use of their personal 
property cited to Challenge Cook or its progeny. 
                                                 
5 Based on my review of every relevant case cited in Register Guard, and every case cited by those cases or 
subsequently cited cases prior to Register Guard, there has been no substantive examination of this issue.  See Johnson 
Tech., Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. 762, 763 (2005); Mid-Mountain Foods, 332 N.L.R.B. 229, 230 (2000), enforced, 269 F.3d 
1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Eaton Techs., 322 N.L.R.B. 848, 853 (1997); Champion Int’l Corp., 303 N.L.R.B. 102, 109 
(1991); Churchill’s Supermarket, 285 N.L.R.B. 138, 155-56 (1987) enforced 857 F.2d 1474 (6th Cir. 1988) (Table); 
NLRB v. Southwire Co., 801 F.2d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 1986); Honeywell, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 1402, 1402 (1982), 
enforced, 722 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1983); Allied Stores of New York, 262 N.L.R.B. 985, 985 n.3 (1982); Union Carbide 
Corp., 259 N.L.R.B. 974, 980 (1981), enforced in relevant part, 714 F.2d 657, 663-664 (6th Cir. 1983); Axelson, Inc., 
257 N.L.R.B. 576 (1981); Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 420 (1981); Container Corp., 244 N.L.R.B. 
318, 318 n.2 (1979), enforced, 649 F.2d 1213 (6th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Group One Broadcasting Co., W., 222 
N.L.R.B. 993, 998 (1976); Vincent’s Steak House, 216 N.L.R.B. 647, 647 (1975); Eastex, Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 271, 272 
(1974); Nugent Serv., Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 158, 161 (1973); Heath Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 134, 135 (1972); Tempco Mfg. 
Co., Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 336, 348 (1969); Challenge Cook Bros. of Ohio, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 92, 99 (1965); see 
generally Hirsch, E-mail and the Rip Van Winkle of Agencies, supra (describing research into NLRB personal property 
precedent). 
6 The ALJ stated in full the following, with no citation or other support:   
 
I have no doubt that if the Respondent had consistently not allowed its employees to use the bulletin boards 
to publicize their personal affairs, the Respondent could properly have prohibited the posting of notices of 
union meetings. But that is not our set of facts. The question, I believe, is whether the Respondent, having 
made its bulletin boards available to employees for posting of notices relating to social and religious affairs, 
as well as meetings of charitable organizations, could validly discriminate against notices of union meetings 
which employees had posted. 
 




In addition to the lack of any meaningful analysis, this line of cases has also deviated 
significantly from its origins.  The earliest cases claiming an expansive rights of employers’ to 
restrict the use of personal property involved claims alleging that employers had discriminatorily 
restricted access to that property.  See Nugent Serv., Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 158, 161 (1973); Tempco 
Mfg. Co., Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 336, 348 (1969); Challenge Cook Bros. of Ohio, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 
92, 99 (1965).  The question of discrimination involves a very different analysis than cases 
involving employees’ basic right to use employer property for Section 7 purposes.  Despite this 
substantial disparity, the Board cited these early discrimination cases to support the very different 
conclusion that employers can always prohibit employees from using employers’ personal 
property for Section 7 purposes.  See Honeywell, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1982), enforced, 722 
F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1983); Container Corp., 244 N.L.R.B. 318 n.2 (1979), enforced, 649 F.2d 1213 
(6th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).  Register Guard, in turn, relied on these subsequent cases and their 
misplaced reliance on discrimination cases. 
As demonstrated, this entire line of personal property cases lack any meaningful 
substantive analysis and, no doubt as a result, conflict with Supreme Court precedent and property 
law.  But even if these cases were on more solid ground, email and other electronic communication 
systems should be treated differently.  Unlike the types of personal property in those cases, use of 
email almost never infringes on others’ use.  Moreover, as discussed in Section III of this brief, 
email and other electronic communications play a far more vital role in the workplace than do 
other forms of employer personal property. See also Purple Communications, 361 N.L.R.B. at 
1057-58 (discussing practical differences between email and personal property with more finite 
usage); Hirsch, Worker Collective Action in the Digital Age, supra, at 926-934 (stressing value of  




precedent addressing bulletin boards, printers, and other employer personal property, electronic 
communications demand a different approach that reflect their importance to employees’ Section 
7 rights. 
The cases cited by Register Guard ultimately arose from these discrimination cases and 
their inapposite citations.  The result is a total lack of substantive justification for a rule that 
abandons Republic Aviation and basic property law in order to provide employers more power to 
restrict use of electronic chattel than real property.  As demonstrated above, any differences 
between the two types of property suggests that employers should have less—not more—authority 
to restrict use of electronic communications.  
II. The Purple Communications Framework is Consistent with the First Amendment 
  A further, constitutional-based objection to the Purple Communications framework is best 
represented by Member Johnson’s dissent in that case.  See 361 N.L.R.B. at 1105-07 (Johnson, 
Member, dissenting); see also Brief for the General Counsel at 7-8, Rio All-Suites Hotel  Casino, 
Case 28-CA-060841 (2018).  Among other objections, Member Johnson argued that recognizing 
employees’ limited right to use employer’s email systems for Section 7 purposes violates the 
First Amendment and Section 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c).  See 361 N.L.R.B. at 1105-07.  However, 
even given the Supreme Court’s recently robust view of free speech, see, e.g., Janus v. Am. 
Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463-65 (2018), this 
argument has no merit.  
The thrust of this position is that the Purple Communications framework offends the First 
Amendment by requiring employers to “pay” for speech that is hostile to their positions.  One 
obvious problem with this assertion is that there is no evidence or reason to think that there are 




large or numerous messages—which employers can already prohibit under Purple 
Communications, 361 N.L.R.B. at 1063-64—the marginal costs of any Section 7 email traffic does 
not require an employer to pay anything more than it already does to maintain its email system.  
Cf. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 34 (1986) (“[B]ecause the 
interest on which the constitutional protection of corporate speech rests is the societal interest in 
receiving information and ideas, the constitutional interest of a corporation in not permitting the 
presentation of other distinct views clearly identified as those of the speaker is de minimis.”); see 
also Hirsch, Communication Breakdown, supra, at 1105, 1122–23.  Moreover, contrary to Member 
Johnson’s dissent, employee email under Purple Communications does not impose production 
costs because that case explicitly stated that employers can limit such messaging to nonwork time.  
See 361 N.L.R.B. at 1063 (adopting presumption that employees have right to use employer email 
for Section purposes “on nonworking time”).  Finally, this cost argument not only makes little 
sense as a factual matter, it also flies in the face of Republic Aviation.  If allowing employee speech 
on an email system during nonwork time imposes an unconstitutional “cost,” then so too would 
allowing employee speech during nonwork time in an employer-maintained plant or other real 
property.   
Member Johnson also attempted to tie Purple Communications to the Supreme Court’s 
Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014), decision.  See 361 N.L.R.B. at 1106 (Johnson, Member, 
dissenting).  But neither Harris, nor the more recent Janus case, supports his position.  The First 
Amendment problem in those cases was a government requirement that individual employees 
provide direct, financial support to union positions with which they disagree.  See Janus, 138 S.Ct. 
at 2463-64, Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2628–34.  In contrast, Purple Communications only says that an 




of workplace email.  See 361 N.L.R.B. at 1063.  This is not a free speech issue.  It is, instead, a 
clear Republic Aviation situation.  In both, employers’ ability to control their property—real 
property in Republic Aviation and the weaker personal property in Purple Communications—is 
limited by employees’ right to use that property for Section 7 purposes.  In other words, if Purple 
Communications violates the First Amendment and Section 8(c), then so too does Republic 
Aviation. 
Member Johnson also made a contradictory free speech argument centered on employee 
confusion.  First, he warned that use of company email will confuse employees into thinking that 
their employer sent the message.  Id.at 1107 (Johnson, Member, dissenting).  But as virtually 
anyone knows—particularly any employee in a work environment in which email is regularly 
used—an email addresses’ suffix (e.g., gmail.com) has nothing to do with the identity of the 
sender.  The majority in Purple Communications put it succinctly:  employees “would no more 
think that an email message sent from a coworker via a work email account speaks for the employer 
. . .  than they would think that a message they receive from a friend on their personal Gmail 
account speaks for Google.”  Id. at 1065.  This is particularly true given Member Johnson’s other 
concern, the potential for messages that are hostile to the employer.  Id. at 1105 (Johnson, Member, 
dissenting).  Assuming Member Johnson is correct about the tenor of Section 7 emails, how would 
any employee mistakenly think that the employer authorized an email that is hostile to itself?  It 
strains credulity to think of this ever happening, much less to a degree warranting an infringement 
on employees’ Section 7 rights.  
Member Johnson also stressed his concern with employers being forced to subsidize speech 
they do not like.  Id. at 1106-07 (Johnson, Member, dissenting).  As noted, there really is no subsidy 




the Board need not consider this issue from scratch, as the Supreme Court has already decided an 
analogous case that clearly undermines Member Johnson’s concern. 
At issue in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), was the FCC’s 
“must carry” rule, which requires cable television channels to carry certain local broadcast stations. 
See 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1)(B) (2013).  Much like the objections here, the cable companies argued 
that the must carry rule unconstitutionally forced them “to transmit speech not of their choosing.”  
512 U.S. at 653-56.  The Court explicitly rejected that argument, holding that, despite free speech 
infringements not at play with NLRB email cases, the must carry rule was constitutional.  Id. at 
636-37 (noting First Amendment issues related to fact that the must carry rule reduces the number 
of channels that cable companies can completely control and makes it more difficult for the 
companies to compete for channels).  Among its justifications for upholding the must carry rule, 
the Court held that the rule does not force companies “to alter their own messages” and that “there 
appears little risk that cable viewers would assume that the broadcast stations carried on a 
cable system convey ideas or messages endorsed by the cable operator.” Id. at 655. 
The decision in Turner Broadcasting sends a clear message:  if a cable company can be 
forced to carry content of a competitor, then surely an employer can be required to allow 
employees to send Section 7-protected messages as part of their pre-existing access to the 
company’s email system.  Cf. William Baude & Eugene Volokh, Compelled Subsidies and the 
First Amendment, 132 HARVARD L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 19) (arguing that 
compelling employees and other individuals to give money does not restrict or compel speech).7 
 
 
                                                 




III. The NLRB’s New Rule Should Apply to all Electronic Communication 
  Although the NLRB’s decision in Purple Communications properly balanced employers’ 
valid business concerns with Supreme Court precedent regarded employees Section 7 rights, it 
should have extended its application to more than just email messages.  The legal rationale of the 
Purple Communications approach, as well as the reality of individuals’ use of electronic 
communications, begs for a rule that extends beyond just emails. 
  Member Johnson was correct when he observed in his Purple Communications dissent that 
the rationale of that decision applies to any type of employer-owned communications system.  See 
361 N.L.R.B. at 1079 (Johnson, Member, dissenting) (“By implication . . . this rationale extends 
beyond email to any kind of employer communications network (be it instant messaging, internal 
bulletin boards, broadcast devices, video communication or otherwise) that employees have access 
to as part of their jobs.”).  Republic Aviation is based on whether an employee uses employer 
property to make Section 7 communications, not on the mode of such communication.  See 324 
U.S. at 797-98, 802 n.8.  Thus, no matter whether employees send email, texts, or other types of 
communication, the Republic Aviation analysis applies.  As a result, the Board’s modern gloss on 
Republic Aviation—either Purple Communications or another rule that respects well-established 
legal precedents—should apply to all forms of electronic communications. 
  The reality of modern communications also demands a rule that applies to more than just 
email messages.  As psychological research demonstrates, all communication is vital to 
employees’ ability to engage in Section 7 collective activity.  See Hirsch, Communication 
Breakdown, supra, at 1095-1101 (discussing research).  Traditionally, electronic communications 
have not been as effective as in-person discussions, see id. at 1107-08, but the explosion in 




means of employee communication.  See id. at 1106, 1119; Hirsch, Silicon Bullet, supra, at 275-
77, 297 (noting growth of electronic communications, increased number of co-workers in different 
geographic locations, and fact that electronic communications can serve as a substitute for 
restrictions on unions’ and other nonemployees’ access to the workplace); William A. Herbert, 
The Electronic Workplace: To Live Outside the Law You Must be Honest, 12 EMP. RTS. & EMP. 
POL’Y J. 49, 97 (2008).   
  Surveys confirm this extraordinary growth in the use of electronic communications in the 
United States.  Although there is a dearth of current data showing the percentage of employees 
who use electronic communications at work, past data and analogies to overall increases in Internet 
use make the obvious point that electronic communications is an essential and growing part of 
many American workplaces. 
  Most generally, there has been a rapid increase in the number of people going online, with 
the percentage of adults in the United States who use the Internet increasing by more than 128% 
over the past decade. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND 
INFORMATION ADMIN., Internet Use at Work (2018) (survey showing Internet usage by individuals 
15 years and older increasing from 34.7% in 1998 to 79.4% in 2017);8 see also Pew Research 
Center, Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet (2018) (survey showing Internet usage rising 71% from 
2000 (52% adults use Internet) to 2018 (89% adults use Internet).9  This growth has been even 
greater in the workplace, with one government survey showing an increase over the past decade 
of 204%.  See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION 
ADMIN., Internet Use at Work (2018) (survey showing usage of Internet at work by individuals 3 
                                                 
8 Available at https://www.ntia.doc.gov/data/digital-nation-data-explorer#sel=workInternetUser&disp=map. 




years and older,10 grew from 9.6% in 1998 to 29.2% in 2017);11 see also Pew Research Center, 
The Web at 25 in the U.S. 19, 31-32 (2014) (describing 2014 survey results showing that, among 
82% of respondents who used the Internet on a given day, 44% of them went online from work);12 
cf. 361 N.L.R.B. at 1067 (Miscimarra, Member, dissenting) (noting importance of Facebook, 
Twitter, and other social media for various types of collective action).  And although email used 
to be the dominant form of electronic communications, that is no longer the case.  For instance, a 
2017 government survey found that individuals who use the Internet employ a variety of 
communication forms: 90.8% use email,13 90.2% use texts or instant messaging,14 and 74.4% use 
social networks.15   
  This research demonstrates the importance of electronic communications to employee 
collective action—the core right embodied in the NLRA.  It also shows that such communications 
are no longer limited or dominated by email.  Accordingly, the NLRB should reaffirm its approach 
in Purple Communications and apply it to all forms of electronic communications.  Such a 
reaffirmation would remain true to Supreme Court precedent and the basic right of collective action 




                                                 
10 The age in this survey is not a typographical error.  Accordingly, the data is intended to demonstrate the increase 
in Internet use at work, rather than a measure of the percentage of employees who use the Internet use at work. 
11 Available at https://www.ntia.doc.gov/data/digital-nation-data-explorer#sel=workInternetUser&disp=map. 
12 Available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/02/PIP_25th-anniversary-of-the-Web_0227141.pdf. 
13 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMIN., Using Email (2018), 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/data/digital-nation-data-explorer#sel=emailUser&demo=&pc=prop&disp=chart. 
14 Id., Text Messaging or Instant Messaging, https://www.ntia.doc.gov/data/digital-nation-data-
explorer#sel=textIMUser&demo=&pc=prop&disp=chart. 








  Email and similar technologies are now common, effective, inexpensive, and unobtrusive 
forms of communication in modern workplaces.  Employers have every right to limit employees’ 
use of electronic communications in the rare instances when they negatively affect legitimate 
business interests.  But when these special circumstances are not present, Supreme Court precedent 
demands a rule that allows employees to use their pre-existing access to email and other electronic 
communications for Section 7 purposes.   
  Employers’ property interest in electronic chattel is simply too weak—especially given the 
imperceptible impact of most electronic communications—to outweigh employees’ Section 7 
rights to communicate with each other at work.  Indeed, employers who treat Section 7 seriously—
as opposed to those who merely want to minimize employees’ ability to exercise their rights—
should welcome the less obtrusive nature of electronic communications.  Accordingly, the NLRB 
should reaffirm the general approach of Purple Communications and extend it to all electronic 
communications. 
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